

Experimental and Development Data

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Plan

- Microeconomic surveys in developing countries
 - Max** quality of research question
 - s.t.** data constraints
- Experimental data in developing countries
 - Max** data quality
 - s.t.** research question
 - Field
 - Lab

Microeconomic Surveys

- Household Surveys:
 - LSMS: Living Standard Measurement Study, World Bank
<http://go.worldbank.org/WK0XNZV3X0>
- Firm Surveys
 - CSAE: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford
<http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/datasets/main.html>
- Citizen Surveys:
 - Afrobarometer
<http://www.afrobarometer.org/>
 - Example: Ethnic Identification in Africa
(Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2009)


Household Surveys: LSMS

- Grosh and Glewwe (1995)
 - Many dimensions of household well-being, including consumption, income, savings, employment, health, education, fertility, nutrition, housing and migration
 - Three different kinds of questionnaires are normally used:
 - household questionnaire, which collects detailed information on the household members (usually 1,600 to 3,200 households)
 - community questionnaire, in which key community leaders and groups are asked about community infrastructure
 - price questionnaire, in which market vendors are asked about prices
 - Extensive quality control procedures
- For the technical side see: Deaton, Angus (1997), 'The Analysis of Household Surveys', World Bank

Firm Surveys: CSAE

- Ghana and Tanzania panels of firms
 - Many dimensions of firm activity: entrepreneurship, investment, labour, government regulation, financial markets, infrastructure, investor confidence, networks, conflict resolution
 - Main research questions:
 - Estimation of structural models of firm behavior
 - e.g. Soderbom and Teal (JDE, 2004), Fafchamps and Soderbom (JHR, 2006)

Citizen Surveys: Afrobarometer



- Four rounds of surveying, first in 12 countries, latest in 19 countries
- Typical survey has 1200-2400 interviews spread over a large number of enumeration areas
- Themes covered: democracy, governance, livelihoods, macroeconomics and markets, social capital, conflict and crime, participation, national identity

- Example: Eifert et al (AJPS, 2008)
 - Research question:
 - Is ethnic identification in Africa endogenous to political competition?
 - Test whether ethnic identification is stronger closer to elections and to more competitive elections
 - Eifert et al use survey data on the primary social identity of more than 35,000 respondents in twenty-two survey rounds across ten African countries (AB)
 - Results:
 - Evidence that the strength of ethnic identification in a given country at a given point in time is related to how close in time the survey is to a competitive presidential election
 - This effect is conditional on the competitiveness of the election

Experimental Data

- This is tailored data, usually not available publicly
- **So: why not gathering your own data?**
 - Field:
 - Example: Electoral violence In Nigeria (Collier and Vicente, 2008)
 - Lab:
 - Example: Ethnicity and public good provision in Uganda (Habyarimana et al, 2007)

Why not gathering your own data?

- Good research is mainly about well-picked/relevant research questions; so max data quality s.t. a good research question may make a lot of sense
- Gathering your own data: easier than you think
 - Yes, funding is needed but...
 - There are ways of getting seed funding and field experience
- Field experience is extremely enriching for research on development:
 - remember the scientific method
 - first step: use your experience to form a good hypothesis
 - i.e. great way to find meaningful research questions
 - remember: normal information flows (media, opinion) are very limited in developing countries

A Field Experiment: Electoral Violence in Nigeria

- Intimidation and violence have been causing thousands of deaths in recent African elections:

just to focus on the last year:

Nigeria (more than 300 killed)

Kenya (more than 1000 killed and 500,000 displaced)

Zimbabwe (more than 100 killed and 5,000 tortured)

- And certainly they have been distorting democracy.

So who is using violence?

And why is it used?

- Collier and Vicente (2008)
 - Research questions:
 - Can a NGO-conducted campaign against electoral violence help in undermining this phenomenon?
 - Is violence diminishing voter turnout?
 - Who are the candidates that are perceived as ‘violence-prone’?

- Design - Treatment
 - Campaign against electoral violence:
 - town meetings
 - popular theatres
 - distribution of materials with a slogan
‘VOTE AGAINST VIOLENT POLITICIANS’
(mechanism: diminishing the cost of protest)

No! *to*



ELECTION VIOLENCE

VOTE AGAINST VIOLENT POLITICIANS.

YARAC



act:onaid
international nigeria

Nigeria - poster




Nigeria - town meetings and popular theatres



Nigeria - distribution of materials and roadshows

- Design - Measurement:
 - panel of surveyed households:
 - perceptions/experience with electoral violence;
 - voting behavior
 - other local sources for quantifiable electoral violence:
 - diaries

Figure: Political Violence Experiment in Nigeria



- Basic Experimental Specifications:

$$1) \quad VC_{ilt} = a + bX_{it} + cY_l + dt + eT_l + ft * T_l + \varepsilon_{ilt}$$

where:

VC is violence and crime,

i, l, t are subscripts for individuals, locations, and time (before / after)

T is a binary variable with value 1 for treated locations,

X is a vector of controls (demographic, attitudinal), potentially time-varying

Y is a geographical fixed effect.

$$2) \quad V_{ilt} = g + hX_{it} + jY_l + kt + mT_l + nt * T_l + \varepsilon_{ilt}$$

where:

V is strict voting behavior (intended-before and actual reported-after)

- Results:

- The randomized campaign against electoral violence led to:
 - decreased perceptions of violence
 - decreased actual intensity of violence (diaries)
 - empowerment on ways to counteract violence
- Electoral violence works through diminishing voter turnout
- Non-incumbents harmed by the anti-violence message

A Series of Lab Experiments: Ethnicity and Public-good Provision in Uganda

- Habyarimana et al (APSR, 2007) explore the mechanisms that link high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision
 - While the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997), there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms
 - The authors propose three possibilities:
 - Preferences (different tastes on public goods, lower altruism)
 - Technology (easier modes of interaction among co-ethnics, networks findability)
 - Strategy selection (ethnicity leading to focal points in multiple equilibria – cooperation vs. defection)
 - Lab games are played to isolate the salience of each mechanism

- Experimental Design (Habyarimana et al 2007):
 - Subjects from an area of Kampala, Uganda, characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity and low levels of public goods provision
 - These subjects play a series of games, each designed to isolate a different mechanism
 - Subjects play multiple rounds of each game with randomized matching - sometimes with co-ethnics, sometimes with non-co-ethnics
 - Games:
 - Preferences: survey questions; standard dictator game in which the offerer is anonymous and the receivers' identities are known
 - Technology: puzzle game, played face-to-face, rewards players based on their ability to complete a joint task in which effective communication is a critical determinant of success; network game, rewarding players for finding random people
 - Strategy selection: non-anonymous dictator game

- Habyarimana et al results:
 - no evidence for preference mechanism
 - no evidence for technology-interaction mechanism
 - evidence in favor of network findability and strategy selection:
 - findings suggest that co-ethnics cooperate because they adhere to in-group reciprocity norms - plausibly supported by expectations that non-contribution will be sanctioned and by an ethnic technology, findability